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Mental Illness and the Conciousness of Freedom:
The Phenomenology of Psychiatric Labelling
by Bruce Bradfield
Paradigmatically led by existential phenomenological premises, as formulated by Jean-Paul Sartre and
Edmund Husserl specifically, this paper aims at a deconstruction of the value of psychiatric labelling in terms
of the implications of such labelling for the labelled individual’s experience of freedom as a conscious
imperative.  This work has as its intention the destabilisation of labelling as a stubborn and inexorable
mechanism for social propriety and regularity, which in its unyielding classificatory brandings is
The Phenomenological Attitude
     At the outset, it is necessary to elucidate the
fact that Sartre’s is a phenomenologically
informed method and attitude.  His concern is not
with freedom as a metaphysical reality which is
diametrically opposed to deterministic influence,
and in view of this fact metaphysically grounded
arguments for determinism cannot invade and
strike down his thesis.  Sartre’s aim is to show
the phenomenological beholding that is a
“specific consciousness of freedom”, and from
this point of view the existence of a physiological
determinism could not invalidate the results of
(his) description (Sartre, 1943: 33, McCulloch,
1994).
    The phenomenological approach is defined by
a rigorous attempt to illuminate, and to bring a
comprehensive resolution to our encounters with
those things in the world which disclose
themselves to us, leaking out in uncovered
energy the revelation that is our experience of our
world (Kruger, 1988). Phenomenology’s concern
is with the individual’s encounter with his world,
and the ways in which meaning, borne out of this
experiential dialogue, is elicited through that
encounter. Phenomenologically, the individual is
present as an openness, and expresses herself to
the world in terms of the activity of taking into
account that which the world presents her with
(Boss, cited in Kruger, 1988).  What then, is the
experience, the phenomenology, of freedom?  As
a condition of consciousness, freedom is grasped
as an openness to the world, and this openness is
the fundamental experience of consciousness of
the world.  Freedom, as an activity of unfurling
and reception, is the bringing of the world into
the hospitable berth that is consciousness.
Freedom is the world’s revelation to being
(ibid.).  Being, understood as a situation, a
presence within the world and its walls, is
conceived of phenomenologically as being-in-
the-world. This situatedness is paradoxically
understood by the phenomenologists as a
bursting out into the world, which, in terms of the
individual’s apprehension of her world, is
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multifariously coloured by the full plethora of
potential representations which that world
discloses.  In describing his perceptions of a tree
Sartre explains: “Knowledge, or pure
representation, is only one of the possible forms
of my consciousness ‘of’ this tree; I can also love
it, fear it, hate it, and this surpassing of
consciousness by itself that is called
‘intentionality’ finds itself again in fear, hatred,
and love.” (Sartre, 1970: 5).  In this sketch of the
ways in which the manifold of experiential
relations which are disclosed through our contact
with the world of phenomena it can be seen that
phenomenology, in its attitudinal focus on the
unborn, the forthcoming, manifests a theoretical
devotion to freedom as an existential necessity
(Howells, 1988).
     Phenomenologically, freedom reveals itself as
a project, that project being the individual’s
existence, her movement into the world.  Man’s
being, says Luijpen (1969) is apprehended in
terms of his freedom as a task, as a compulsion,
which man, revealing himself within the shining
dynamism that is his potential, must endure.  For
the existential phenomenologist, the individual’s
projection of herself into her world, and into the
future, manifests as an indispensable necessity
which, almost implacably, bellows forth the order
“You must become that which you are not yet.”
Consideration of the implications which this
imperative holds in relation to man’s
phenomenological experience of himself as a
situatedness will follow in what is, necessarily, a
somewhat diffuse inquiry into Sartre’s ontology.
Self as Transcendant
   Consciousness, as a potential for motion and
directedness, is posited as a radical freedom,
which expresses itself through the human person
which is its agent, its manifestation.  As an
advancement, a propulsion into the future,
consciousness is defined as intentionality.  In this
sense, intentional consciousness is a “being
beyond itself”, (Sartre, 1970).  It is a perpetual
flight into the future, which is thereby understood
as consciousness’ intentional object, and it is in
terms of this being beyond itself that
consciousness defines itself as that which cannot
be seized, ensnared, and turned into substance.
Sartre eloquently affirms this imminence that
defines the motioning of being in his bold
pronouncement that “man is, before all else,
something which propels itself towards a future”
(Sartre, 1948, p. 28).  The phenomenological
enterprise grasps intentional consciousness as
that which casts itself out into the world of
things; it projects itself in intentional motion
towards the world.  In this sense, “consciousness
is always consciousness of something”, and in its
motion is aimed at that something (Brooke, 1991:
42).  This distinguished Husserlian axiom is the
birthplace of the philosophy of transcendence,
which apprehends consciousness as a perpetual
motion, elementally resistant to constraint and
demarcation.  Man, as a subjectivity, a
consciousness, is not grasped as a being fixed in
his world (Luijpen, 1969). Instead, as a being-in-
the-world, his occupation is understood as
dynamic, ec-static.  This dynamism is disclosed
in the life-world of the experiencing individual as
a basic and cardinal element of her subjectivity:
“The dynamism of human existence is the
dynamism of subjectivity as freedom.”
(ibid:186).  It is this “free movement of
existence” (Beauvior, 1964: 29) which so fully
informs and colours the individual’s subjectivity,
and it is through this fundamental experience of
self-government that subjectivity and freedom, in
their distinct intertwinement, are affirmed.  “To
be a subject is to be free.” (Luijpen, 1969: 187).
 In La Transcendance de l’Ego (1936) Sartre’s
conception of the self as a freedom in action
reveals an understanding of the self as constituted
by pure intentionality, which is its direction, its
imperative (Cited in Howells, 1988).
Consciousness, as an intentional activity, is given
in the lived world as a non-optional and
irreducible imperative which must be in the sense
of be-ing (Brooke, 1991).  As a dynamic
occurrence, consciousness cannot be an encased
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and circumscribed existence, and it is in terms of
this understanding that consciousness as a
transcendence is perceived.  The self, as an
experience of unity, the ‘I’, is in this sense
conceived of as a transcendent product of
consciousness, which Sartre sees as disclosing
the potential for transcendence that is the source
and centre of meaning (Sartre, 1936).  This
meaning, this signification, Sartre suggests, is
derived from the transcendent function which
consciousness, in its activity as an intentional
capacity, unfolds and reveals. Consciousness as
an intentional space manifests in the
phenomenological encounter that is the
individual’s transcendence of that which she is,
and of that which holds her and delimits her.  It is
in understanding consciousness as intentionality,
as a motion towards free action, that the self as a
transcendent existence can be grasped (Wild,
1963), and it is from the phenomenological
closeness which this understanding reveals that
this author draws his theoretical impetus.
Being-In-The-World and the Being of
Freedom
    Freedom, as an ontological status, a mode of
being in the world, is defined by a
“presuppositionless and undetermined upsurge of
the for-itself in every moment of life.” (Caws,
1979: 115).  What follows is an account of
Sartre’s ontology of being-in-the-world as it
relates to the freedom that is conscious being.
Sartre’s ontological formulation posits a division
in modes of being-in-the-world in which two
radically distinct ‘regions’ of being, termed
being-in-itself and being-for-itself, are
differentiated.  Essentially, being-in-itself is the
being of non-conscious objects, and is definable
in terms of its properties; its features are
understood as bounded, encased and delineated.
Inherent to the mode of being-in-itself is the
principle of identity (Sartre, 1943).  Sartre aligns
with the analytical principle of judgement in
which the being-in-itself, the object, is identical
with itself (Busch, 1990).  In this sense, being-in-
itself “simply is what it is” (Sartre, 1943: 58), in
that it is identical with itself, and cannot become
that which it is not.  This keyboard upon which I
lay my fingers has no potential to escape itself in
the mode of becoming.  In its brute, undeviating
embeddedness i t  s tays,  unchanging,
unchangeable.  In its being it is a limitation, an
inflexibility. Being-in-itself, by virtue of its
adherence to the principle of identity, is thus
conceived of in opposition to being-for-itself,
which shall be explicated shortly, and which, for
the purposes of this paper, is of greater import
and gravity.  As an object of consciousness,
being-in-the-world partakes of the mode of
being-in-itself insofar as such a being, the
individual human, is bound to a degree by those
properties which are perceived as partaking in the
mode of the being of objects. My body, as an
object in the world, is a being-in-itself, as are
those distinctive elements of my situation which
define me, which are my limitation.
Consciousness depends on being as being is
consciousness’ revelation, its unfolding.  This
being upon which consciousness depends exists
in the mode of being-in-itself, as an intentional
object.  I shall explore this aspect of Sartre’s
ontology further on, bringing resolution to this
somewhat ambiguous theoretical convolution that
is man in the world.
     It is now necessary to explicate the mode of
being of the individual consciousness that is
being-for-itself. Being-for-itself is conscious
being in that being-for-itself must be conscious
and consciousness must be an activity of being,
but insofar as it is grasped as an activity of
consciousness, and thus as a propulsion into the
future at which it aims itself, being-for-itself is
not identical with consciousness. Barnes, cited in
Howells (1992), provides the following account
of the relationship between consciousness and
being:
Although consciousness reveals being,
the fundamental opposition on which he
[Sartre] builds his ontology is not that
between consciousness and being but
the distinction between two regions of
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beings, only one of which is
characterised as inextricably associated
with consciousness.  These are being-
in-itself and being-for-itself, but insofar
as being-for-itself is, it has the same
being as being-in-itself.  It is
distinguished only by the presence in
itself of the activity we experience as
consciousness.  These two regions of
being are inseparable except abstractly,
and the truth is that the distinction
between being-for-itself and being-in-
itself is less clear cut and more complex
than first appears (Barnes, cited in
Howells, 1992:15).
Consciousness and being are thus understood at
once as distinct and disunited, and at the same
time their entangled undividedness is accounted
for and articulated through Sartre’s ontology.
This ambiguity, which shall be explored in
greater depth, in connection with its bearing on
the individual’s phenomenology of freedom as an
existential certainty, has fundamental
implications for the unfolding of Sartre’s account
of human freedom.  In terms of the
intervolvement that is being-for-itself’s partaking
in the mode of being-in-itself, Sartre suggests
that consciousness is transcendent because it can
transcend what it is, and grasp what it is not, in
this case unrealised goals and ideals (Sartre,
1943).  Since every act, Sartre argues, is a
projection of the for-itself towards that which is
not, it follows that no factual state, whether it be
the political or economic structure of the
individual’s society, the individual’s cultural and
social milieu, nor even her psychological state,
can determine consciousness (ibid.) .
Consciousness’ freedom lies in its ability to go
beyond, to transcend that which it is, in a vibrant
intentional motioning towards a state of being
other than that which it is now (Anderson, 1993).
In his existence, man as a subject, a
consciousness, is posited as a being that is not
yet, but can and must be, and in his being borne
as an activity in relation to this imperative, man
is apprehended, defined by liberty and the frank
openness that is his autonomy, as a capacity to
transcend his circumstance (Salvan, 1962).  It is
to the encounter between the individual, as a
freedom in activity, and the factical delineation
which is her position, her location, that the focus
of this work now turns.
    In her engagement with the world, the
individual’s freedom is disclosed as an
independence “in relation to a thing” (Beauvoir,
1964: 29).  In this sense, freedom is lived as a
proud affirmation which renounces the
hampering enclosure that is the individual’s
situation, which presents itself as a restriction of
her motion towards transcendence. Freedom is
thus experienced phenomenologically as the
perennial wellspring of ambiguity which is
disclosed in the individual’s encounter with her
world.  This ambiguity is grasped in terms of
existential phenomenology as an experiential
confrontation between freedom and facticity.
There are, constituted within being-for-itself,
aspects which are object-like, and which partake
in the mode of being-in-itself, that is, the mode of
being an object. Being-for-itself is not simply an
unconstrained movement into the future, and it is
in relation to its facticity that this essential
revelation of the limitation that is being-in-itself,
that this ambiguity is experienced. Facticity is the
collective term which Sartre employs in
description of these elements of the being of the
self.  Within this conception are included such
aspects as the individual’s history, race, socio-
economic state, sex, and body. One’s
psychological constitution, to a certain degree,
may also constitute one’s facticity, but more on
this later.  In his meeting with the world, the
individual is not grasped in his entirety as an
evanescent and ephemeral motion towards the
future at which he projects himself.  In his flight
of manumission he is not as the wraith which,
insubstantial, elusive, glides unshackled through
stone as through air.  Consciousness is not then
understood as the totality of being, for this would
be a fragile hypothesis; instead consciousness is
taken as the nucleus of being, its impetus, and the
source from which being casts itself out into the
world of possibilities.  Being-for-itself, the being
of consciousness, has freedom with respect to the
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manifold of conceivable or imaginable
interpretations or valuations of its facticity. It is
being-for-itself’s freely chosen representation of
it’s factical stance which gives to that location
the especial psychic signification and eminence
which being-for-itself, in its full liberty, deems
that situation to own.  Being-for-itself is free with
respect to what it takes its facticity to represent,
and what value it gives to its facticity. History,
gender, race, and the like, relate to being-for-
itself insofar as the significance which they hold,
and the values which they represent with regard
to being-for-itself’s current projects are
determined by being-for-itself itself.  It is in this
sense that consciousness is grasped as that which,
in its attitude, its appraisal, is the
phenomenological revelation of being (Barnes,
cited in Howells, 1992). Being unfolds in relation
to consciousness, and it is consciousness that
wills it as such. Being, in its freedom, its motion,
allows for the unfolding of the world in relation
to its movement through the world as an activity
of freedom. As a dynamism, a propulsion into the
f u t u r e ,  b e i n g - f o r - i t s e l f  u n f o l d s
phenomenologically as the capacity to transcend
its facticity, which is the object-like circumstance
of being-in-the-world. On the contrary, insofar as
being-for-itself, as consciousness of the particular
world in which it exists, is capable only of
unclosing in a manifold of unbound choices, it is
at the same time limited by the range of choices
which it is awarded within the specificity that is
the mould and enclosure of its situation.
Sartre defines the situation as an
ambiguous phenomenon inasmuch as it
is the common product of the in-itself
and freedom, and, he adds, it is
impossible to delineate precisely what
comes from the in-itself and what from
freedom (Anderson, 1993: 21).
     On a more abstract level this somewhat
elusive ambiguity is disclosed as an existential
certainty. In this sense my facticity, which is
understood both as the facticity of my own being
and that of my situation, my seat in the world of
beings other than myself, is an elemental
condition, grasped as an absolute necessity for
my condition of freedom (ibid.).
 Real freedom demands that I be located in a
world of really existing things that separate
me from my goals, while also offering the
possibility of attaining them.  Otherwise my
mere wish or dream would suffice for me to
attain my ends, and choice would be
unnecessary and impossible.  In other
worlds, ‘if no obstacle, then no freedom.’
(ibid: 22, Sartre 1943: 484).
In order to be free, then, it is necessary that I
realise that which constrains me, that which is
my enclosure; and it is out of this realisation that
my freedom - which is the fundamental
experience and activity of my consciousness,
yields and brings forth the multifarious
colouration that is the meaning, the signification
which I give to my world.  I am not free with
respect to the circumstance within which my
world, in all its rowdy tumult positions me.  But
insofar as I am my consciousness, I am that
which, in my encounters with the world, gives to
the world that splendorous lustre, or that
lugubrious bleakness, or that happy
effervescence, which I, as free consciousness,
deem it to own.
Human reality everywhere encounters
resistance and obstacles which it has not
created, but these resistances and obstacles
have meaning only in and through the free
choice which human reality is (Sartre, 1943:
495).
It is this enveloping and persistent ambiguity, this
enigmatic ontological scheme, which
characterises the individual’s experience of
herself as a freedom, an openness, which is
nonetheless present to the shackling delimitation
that is her being-in-the-world.  To say that  the
individual is free is to say that she is present to a
trial, a defiance; it is to say that, in her
paradoxical freedom, she advances towards a
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conquest, which is always precarious, provoking,
and challenging (Marcel, 1963; Warnock, 1966).
It is in this sense that human reality unfolds as an
ambiguous interaction and interpermeation of
transcendence and facticity.
     The reason for this somewhat lengthy and
abstruse exegesis of Sartre’s ontology will
become evident when considering its
implications for the phenomenological
presencing of the mentally ill individual, as a
branded and divisioned entity, within his world
of experience.  It is to this alternative beholding,
this recourse of the ‘normal’ encounter with the
lived world that I turn next.
The Phenomenology of the Scientific Attitude:
The Biomedical Model of Psychiatric
Intervention
     The predominant framework for studying
mental disorders in psychiatry is known variously
as the medical model, the biomedical model or
the disease model (Kiesler, 2000).  This
foundation, so vigorously informed by the
scientific paradigm, posits mental and physical
illness as equivalent in all fundamental respects.
In this sense, mental illness is formulated in
terms of a functional psychosis, most likely the
consequence of a neurophysiological disorder,
and therefore conceived of, and classified in
terms of a physical disease (Szasz, 1987).
Mental illness, as conceptualised by the medical
model, results from biological abnormalities in
the “brain, central nervous system, autonomic
nervous system, and/or endocrine system”
(Kiesler, 2000: 17), and understood as such
mental illness is situated within the sphere of
biological causation and determination as a
disease entity (Szasz, 1987).  An exploration of
the scientist’s  deplorable sacrifice of humanism
as the fundamental and most appropriate impetus,
in favour of the obdurate and unfeeling “lure of
positivism” (Szasz, 1973: 191) will follow.
 The biomedical model of disease makes the
implacable assertion that the predominant and
sole causes of mental disorders, those conditions
which are both necessary and sufficient for the
genesis of a mental illness, are manifestly and
irrefutably biological deviations and
abnormalities (Kiesler, 2000). Investigation into
the biochemical and genetic constitution of the
mentally ill individual is deemed to be of
paramount importance in the elicitation of the
cause, the biological birthplace of the illness.
Faulty genes that produce abnormal
neurotransmitter activity at cortical
synapses, structural anomalies of the
central nervous system, or abnormal
hormonal activity. Mental disorders are
not the result of aversive parental
behaviours, of societal deprivations or
discriminations, and are certainly not
the result of personal choice.” (ibid: 19)
This unremitting pronouncement is exemplary of
the blatant ‘biologization’ to which psychiatry, as
a quintessentially human intervention, has fallen
prey.  Present day psychiatry, or more suitably
termed, biopsychiatry (ibid: 23), motions towards
an unsubtle bypassing of those individual,
interpersonal and social elements of existence
which so obviously const i tute the
phenomenologically understood genesis of
mental illness.  These inherently human
components of the individual’s lived world are
awarded with no causal efficaciousness as far as
mental illness as a developmental contingency is
concerned, and this misplacement of causal
relevance has dire implications for the method of
intervention which the psychiatrist, as scientist,
adopts in her dull, unyielding office. The
biomedical model proceeds through a stringent,
inflexible process of identification, deduction and
treatment.  Initially, the biopsychiatrist aims at
generating a symptomatically informed
understanding of the individual’s behavioural
manifestations which posits such manifestations
as indicative of a particular syndrome, a
specifically defined and identified disease entity
which lends itself to reliable diagnosis.  Once this
has been established, the biological aetiology –
that is, the genetic origins representing a potential
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causal connection with the development of the
disease, must be explored.  Potential anomalies
such as a biochemical imbalance, or a
neuroanatomical abnormality are sought out as
being significant components of the biological
aetiology of disease.  The apprehension of such
“biological deviance” (Kiesler, 2000: 27) allows
the researcher, the indubitable biopsychiatrist, to
evaluate and decide upon the most compelling
and operative biological intervention, which aims
at the alleviation of the individual’s syndrome
(ibid.).
    The scientific rigour and meticulousness of
this procedure seems certain and incontrovertible
when applied to the biomedical interventions
which characterise attempts to cure physical
ailments. It seems indubitable that a
symptomatically led evaluation of the biological
glitches and malfunctions which emerge as
symptoms of a physical ailment are approximated
and conceptualised in terms of the biological
aetiology out of which they are indisputably
borne.  However, insofar as mental illness
unfolds and reveals itself as an experience of the
individual within his world, an understanding of
mental illness, and by extension the treatment of
such illness, in terms of a biologically informed
enlightenment, is fundamentally incomplete.
Symptomatological diagnosis based on the
manifold of symptoms definitive of the
individual’s specific illness, and understood in
terms of the biological aetiology which, it is
supposed, is the genesis of that illness, reveals a
distinct methodological and phenomenological
gap, in which the individual, as patient, is left
misunderstood, and incompletely grasped (Kraus,
1987). Based upon the operational logic that is
the bounding delimitation of the natural scientific
attitude, the symptomatological diagnostics of
biopsychiatry, in attempting to conceive of
mental illness in terms descriptive of a physical
disease entity, collapses when considered in
relation to the anguishing subject upon which it
bases its descriptions.  It is quite patently evident,
when considering the intervolving complexity of
the human mind in terms of the pathologies,
which are the potential weight and burden of that
mind, that a rose is not a rose, is not a rose.  And
therefore, the function of psychiatric diagnosis,
which operates according to this principle of
identity (Goodwin & Guze, 1996), appears at the
very least ‘pseudoscientific’ when applied as a
methodological tool within psychological
research (Ross & Pam, 1995).  It is towards a
consideration of the subject, the mentally ill
individual, as the one whose mental illness is
radically oversimplified and distorted (Rishter
and Lucksted, 2000) that I turn next.
The Scientific Attitutude and the Solidification
of Conciousness
    The principle of entities of illness which
accompanies the idea of specific aetiologies of
illness according to the biomedical model, as
afore-mentioned, is related significantly to the
notion of biological causality (Kraus, 1987).  In
this sense, the mentally ill individual is conceived
of in terms of a biological determinism which
renders that individual as diseased, and
manifesting a physiological abnormality.  The
individual is comprehended as having an illness,
rather than being ill. The semantic construction
which typifies the biomedical model thus
conceives of the individual not in terms of the
phenomenological encounter which describes the
mentally ill individual’s meeting with her world
of experience. Instead, this construction - that of
having an illness - posits mental illness as
something separate, and unambiguously
delineated (ibid.).  Symptomatological diagnosis
- fundamental to the nomothetic methodology of
the biomesdical model, in positing a biologically
determined disease entity, reveals a distinct
phenomenological illegitimacy as far as its
relation to the science of humanism is concerned.
Through an elucidation of the scientific attitude
of psychiatric intervention, and an analytical
probing into the impact of this understanding on
the diagnosed individual, as subject to the
essential dehumanisation upon which this attitude
is based, I hope to unclose this methodology as
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being phenomenologically unfitting, insubstantial
and ineffectual.
     Medard Boss, in his work Existential
foundations of medicine and psychology (1979),
expressed with lucidity and vigour the ways in
which the scientific attitude, when soullessly
forced upon the study of the human subject,
colours that study with an unremitting bleakness,
lacking entirely the rich and deeply personal
character which is so inherent to the value of the
psychological endeavour, as an exploration into
the human world of lived experience. Boss
suggests that natural science, when emphasised
as a foundational methodology within the human
sciences, overlooks, and remains always
inaccessible to the mode of human existence.
What follows is an explication of what Boss cites
as the function of scientific methodology, that is,
to secure a prescientific notion of spatiality, and
to understand the subject in terms of that
spatiality.
The first task of medicine as a strictly
rational science of man is to define
precisely prescientific notions of
‘somewhere in space’ and ‘somewhere
in time’ (1979: 86).
This conception of the spatiality of the world
upon which the busy scientist focuses his lens has
pervaded scientific understanding. The grasping
of space as a scientific objective is seen as a
conquest, an enchantment. The calculation and
comprehension of spatial relationships in terms
of mathematical measurement manifests as a
function beautiful to the eye of the scientist.
Space is thereby reduced, through the
conceptualisation of space in terms mathematical,
to intervals between points, homogeneous
distances between points, and geometrical
dimensions. Historically, says Boss, the scientific
objective has been this reduction of space to its
mathematical spatial relations.This reduction is
achieved through a process of emptying regions
of space, and grasping space as a void,
uninterrupted by the significations of the things
that occupy that space, so as to allow for honest
and exact calculation.  Of course, it seems
commonsensical and methodologically astute to
apply this reduction to the province of inanimate
objects.  An understanding of the distance
between two points would be troubled with
endless complications were it necessary to take
into account the ‘things’ occupying and
entangling the space between those two points.  It
is when this treatment of the world, this exacting,
inflexible spatialisation, is transferred to the
ideographic methodology which must necessarily
characterise the human sciences, that absurdity,
and implausibility result. “The geometrical
representation of space, admirably suited to the
mastery of inanimate objects, was transferred
without thought to the spatiality of human
existence.” (Boss, 1979: 86).  But on what
grounds, asks Kruger (1988) can the transference
of this “natural scientific dogmatism” (ibid: 20)
be thought of as manifesting any measure of
methodological exactness and accuracy?  How
can it be said that man, grasped within the
experiential fullness that is his lived world, can
be better understood if one is able to measure
him?  If the researcher into the human subject is
to maintain any degree of methodological
integrity, the web of intervolving relationships
that is human existence cannot be reified through
scientific calculation and mathematical
discernment. “The millimetre is not found in
nature.” (ibid: 36), it is a construction of the
scientist who, in her urgent motioning towards
measurement and division, aims to understand
the bare facts of her world, stripped of
entanglements and complications. The subject of
the psychiatrist as operative in terms of this
scientific endeavour is therefore isolated,
encapsulated, reduced.  Her condition, her
suffering, becomes a variable, a stale and hard bit
of information with which the unfeeling scientist
works. Upon the subject is conferred a basic
meaninglessness.  Her situation becomes barren,
hollow and nonsensical, as she is discerned and
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calculated by the implacable gaze of the scientist.
Adamant, fierce in his vision, the scientist takes
the subject apart; defines her properties, describes
them from within his range of vision as facts,
observable and understandable as points,
objectifiable elements in a world of objects.
Conciousness as an Object of the Scientific
Endeavour
    Diagnosis, as operative within scientifically
informed interventions into mental illness, occurs
within the subject’s consciousness, says Wright
(1984), and introduces into that consciousness a
jarring ambiguity. Labelling, as a scientific
imperative, is concerned with that which is
explicit, substantial and concrete, therefore the
symptomatological diagnostics of the biomedical
model, insofar as this model aims at identifying
and classifying mental illnesses as exactly
defined disease entities, seems well-suited to the
classification of physical diseases. To say that
one has epilepsy is to locate a fundamentally
physiological infirmity in a specific part of the
brain, to cite its biological aetiology, and to posit
a particular treatment. As a biologically regulated
malady, epilepsy can be delineated and
anatomised in the lexicon of the natural scientific
operative.  Physical disease, then, can be grasped
as incontrovertibly bounded.  The diseased body
can be anatomised and scrutinised, leading to
meticulous and unerring discovery of the space
which the disease, as a physical entity, occupies
and environs.  It is when this essential dissection
of the disease, as an embodied and quantified
thing, is transferred and imposed as a
methodological exigency on to the human
sciences, that a violent ambiguity emerges.
     The psychiatrist, operating as “doctor for
diseases of the soul” (Van den Berg, 1987), aims
his diagnostic bolt at the individual’s
consciousness, her subjectivity; but in his
capacity as scientist and technician, he reifies that
consciousness, thereby literalising the metaphor
that is mental illness (Szasz, 2000).  Through the
symptomatological diagnosis of the biomedical
model the consciousness of the mentally ill
individual is biologised, ‘thingified’ at the hands
of the mechanomorphic functioning of the
scientific endeavour (Szasz, 1973: 196).  It is
through the scientific orientation towards the
spatiality of human existence that the mentally ill
subject is converted into a diseased object.  This
soulless dissection and classification of the
individual subject is grounded in the biomedical
priority of bodyhood and physical coexistence in
a world of fundamentally physical entities (Boss,
1979). In investigating the constitutional
biological determinants of mental illness,
psychiatry, always unshakable in its employment
of symptomatological diagnostics, casts its exact
and systematic gaze on the working of the
“troubled brain” rather than the “troubled mind”
(Andreason, cited in Kiesler, 2000: 26).
  Inexorably dogmatic in its focus on biological
mechanism, psychiatry, and psychiatric diagnosis
in specific, evinces a dull unfeeling act of
discernment, which posits the subject’s psychic
unrest as being comprehensively reducible to a
physiological disturbance.  The individual’s
experience, his subjective apprehension of
himself as a mentally ill individual, is simplified.
The rich entanglement that is his manifold of
experience is denied.  He has a sickness.  That is
all.  It is this author’s suggestion that the act of
diagnosis, the act of informing the patient that
her being as a mentally ill individual is
fundamentally and completely understandable in
terms scientific and biological, involves an
unmindful and tactless reduction that amounts to
a total degradation of the individual’s experience
of her illness.  It is in the act of telling, in that
grave informative step which ‘enlightens’ and
instructs the patient that her subjective
experience, her consciousness of illness, is
grounded in a physiological malfunction, that
psychiatry evinces an implacable unkindness. To
be told that my subjective experience of illness,
my most intimately felt concern, is a mere
biological manifestation, disallows that
experience, it robs it of meaningfulness. And it
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does this by incontestably dubbing that
experience as an objective symptom of a
neurologically based disease entity, an easily
identifiable structural anomaly (Szasz, 1987).
Thought becomes object, and consciousness is
objectified.  It is precisely this objectivity, states
Kraus (1987), which is not distinctive of the
mode of conscious being.  Description of the pre-
objective nature of the experience of mental
illness, a description which does not
“temporalise, spatialise and mundanise” that
experience, is more fundamentally appropriate to
the functioning of the human sciences (ibid: 32).
     It is now necessary to procure an
understanding of the implications which the
scientific attitude, as a function of spatialisation
and objectification, have for the individual in
terms of the phenomenological experience of
being diagnosed.
     Psychiatric assessment, the assessment of
persons presenting themselves as demonstrating
or displaying a particular system of complaints, is
brought to its most judicious and apparent
clarification  in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition
(DSM 4 from hence forth), as conceived and
articulated by the American Psychological
Association. The most fundamental feature of
this text, this bastion of analytical certitude, is its
provision of diagnostic criteria to improve the
reliability and vigour of diagnostic estimations
and verdicts. It is the authors intent to reveal the
ways in which the classificatory prescriptions of
this apparently invincible tool of enlightenment
and acutely reasonable politic functions to
prescribe the ill individual’s actions, saying what
those actions should be, and what they are, in
accordance with the specifics of the illness which
the individual presents. To echo the sentiments of
one of the participants who contributed to this
study:
All my actions, and my explanations for
those actions, are understood in terms
of my label.  All my actions, x, y, and z,
are misinterpreted and are seen as the
actions of a person with my label.
In this sense, the diagnostic system employed by
the psychiatric community at large, as it is
grasped by this researcher and by the participants
whose expressions are the source of meaning and
truth as recounted in this essay, discloses a
distinctly ungenerous politic of restriction, which
functions as a disseverance of the sick individual
from her inherently experience of her illness.
This structure of statistical diagnosis essentially
informs the individual of the specific system of
behaviours which one manifesting her illness
would, and should present, thereby delineating
the potential behavioural motions of that
individual within the terms of the diagnostic
classification to which she is thought to belong.
This notion of “belonging” to the diagnosis
unfolded within the asseverations of the
participants in this study as an entrapment which
clouds one’s identity, and conceals all
uniqueness.
     I would like to proceed in my argument for
this point with an examination of the notion of
the category, as it is understood and expressed as
an axiom within the DSM 4 diagnostic system:
Psychiatric diagnoses are described as
examples of ‘natural categories;
concepts that define and group world
objects by a set of rules, and which
have the characteristics of being
organised around ‘best examples’ or
‘prototypes’ possessing vague or fuzzy
boundaries.’ (Fraumann, 1994: 4, cited
in Rentoul, 1995: 51).
The notion of the category, as it is conceptualised
within the psychiatric framework, posits a
categorically defined class of entities that is
objectively observable in the world.  Cognitive
psychology makes the necessary distinction
between such categories and the relative concepts
which are descriptive of the constituents of those
categories.  The position taken within the DSM 4
classificatory system, however, does not
differentiate between concepts and the categories
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which are their exemplification, and makes the
somewhat dubious assumption, based on it’s
inherently naïve realism, that descriptions
generated correspond directly and precisely with
phenomena as they are manifest in the world
(ibid). This unbending construction of the
category as the most exact and definitive account
of the vagaries of mental illness is based on a
grouping together of conditions displaying
particular symptoms, which are shown to be
demonstrably born out of a common
biopsychosocial aetiology (World Health
Organisation, 1992).  It is suggested in this
dissertation that the category, as a descriptive
tool within the psychiatric operative, functions
simultaneously as a predictive forecasting of
expected behavioural manifestations which, it is
suggested, will unfold as behaviours
symptomatic of the illness. It is the belief of this
author that this inherently predictive description
which typifies the languaging of the diagnostic
system functions to prescribe the behaviour of
the mentally ill individual, thereby channelling
that individual’s behaviour.  The individual’s
behaviour is thus constrained, rendered
determinable, and fundamentally tightened by the
shackles of the label which becomes that
individual’s mould.  The one-to-one dialogic
relationship which psychiatric discourse assumes
as being definitive of its descriptions, in which
the category or diagnostic brand is grasped as
identical with a specific phenomenological
revelation in the world, is apprehended by this
researcher as a very real delimitation of the
indeterminable fullness of that experience. And it
is in terms of the pretensions towards exactitude
which the diagnostic system upholds, that this
constriction is most stringently evinced.  It is this
appraisal of the motions of the sick individual
which so unfeelingly manacles the creative
progression of that individual through her wholly
labyrinthine course.
Conclusion
     The bleak denouement of this curling
expression of the phenomenological unclosing of
psychiatric diagnosis, as this author understands
it to be felt by the labelled individuals who are its
victims, amounts to a tightening devitalisation of
the freedom of individual subjectivity and
consciousness. It is suggested in this paper that
through the act of telling, in which the individual
– diminished and incapacitated in her position as
the one diagnosed – is informed of her diagnosis,
that the individual is thereby clasped, bound in a
fastening hold, and thus contained.
     The somewhat diffuse exploration of the
Sartrean notion of consciousness, as exposed
within this work, presents what this author grasps
as being the most correct expression of
consciousness as an experiential  relatedness that
is man’s being in the world.  It is within this
theoretical context that my conviction in the
delimiting effects of labelling finds its grounding
and its reason. As has been explicated here-in,
consciousness can only be grasped as that which
is essentially shapeless, fugitive in its motion,
and limitless in its potential and agency (Sartre,
1957). Consciousness lives its fluidity, its
unclasped evanescence and dynamism, through
the embodied realness that is man’s being-in-the-
world.  And so, although Sartre defines the being
of consciousness as that which is unbounded,
always shifting in its own intentionality, he at the
same time acknowledges those factical
constraints which are the object-like elements of
being-in-the-world, and which function to locate
the individual, to place her within that which she
calls her ‘situation’.  The existence of the
conscious being is therefore ambiguously defined
as a freedom within facticity, a drifting
consciousness within a distinct encapsulating
channel (Sartre, 1943).  Within this ontological
ambiguity that is said to structure the experience
of individual consciousness, Sartre nonetheless
expresses a conviction in the experientially real
freedom which he advocates as definitive of
man’s being-in-the-world.  Thus, those elements
of being-for-itself which operate as the situating
of consciousness within its objective location, are
not, according to Sartre’s schema, experienced as
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a total limitation of the ec-static freedom that is
conscious being.  Freedom within facticity is still
freedom in totality.
     It is at this point that the function of the
diagnostic label as a concealment, and an
essential thwarting of individual freedom can be
seen.  It is suggested that the label is met by the
experiencing individual as that which prescribes,
stipulates, delineates and circumscribes that
individual’s being-in-the-world.  As has been
expressed, the label is disclosed as a placing of
consciousness within a scientifically (and
biologically) defined spacio-temporal location.
Through the label, the consciousness of the
labelled individual is dissected, anatomised, and
giving a form (Boss, 1979).  The label unclothes
in the presence of the individual as a systematic
and implacable encasement within which that
individual is said to fit, and it is through this
exigent fixture that the labelled individual comes
to grasp himself as enclosed, bound up, and
petrified*.  It is through the act of labelling that
consciousness is given an undeviating and
scientifically defined form, and thereby translated
into that which is substantial, immovable,and
motionless.  The shifting autonomy that once
defined consciousness is converted through the
diagnostic act into a still and brute fact, which is
robbed of its being as an intentional directedness.
Consciousness is thereby turned into that which
is unalterable, shrouded and clutched within its
identity. It is thus that the consciousness of the
labelled individual, as it is grasped by this author,
begins to partake in the mode of the being of
objects, that is, being-for-itself.  In being
informed of its presencing in the world as an
unbending fact, a fixed situatedness, the
consciousness of the labelled individual is
thereby robbed of its freedom; its fleeting
potentiality is despoiled and disallowed.  It is
thus that consciousness, through the experiential
prescriptivism and clasping circumscription
inherent within the phenomenological disclosure
of the label, is most unfortunately and
relentlessly bound, pinioned, and fastened.
*I use the word “petrified” here in its literal
sense, that is, the conversion of a substance into
stone.
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